I’ve been considering the third day of the Battle of Gettysburg (3 July 1863). Let me set the scene, playing with ‘what ifs…’. Gettysburg was the biggest clash up to that point between the Union Army of the Potomac under George Meade with the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia under the legendary Robert E Lee. It was also an action that neither army wanted or was prepared for but somehow the armies had been brought into greater proximity than might be expected from pickets. Generally this is attributed to skirmishes from the Confederate army entering the town of Gettysburg to find shoes. Why did they need shoes? For the answer to that question you have to look at the roots of the two armies.
The Army of the Potomac, around 100,000 men was fed, equipped and sustained by the powerhouse of Unionist industry and the army was well clothed in consequence. The Confederate army (around 75,000 strong) was an entirely different force. Drawing from the southern states and their largely ‘white trash’ demographic, many rebels could barely scrape together a grey coat let alone find premium items of uniform such as shoes. Perhaps a quarter had no shoes, and would help themselves to any found among the dead. Moreover, the Army of Northern Virginia by crossing the Potomac and entering enemy country had no access to reinforcements or supplies. Lee was, for this reason, keen to bring the war to a conclusion by a dramatic Confederate victory in battle and the simultaneous presentation to President Abraham Lincoln of ceasefire terms.
Back to the shoes. Searching for shoes in the town of Gettysburg itself, the Confederate skirmishers ran into union pickets that should not have been there since the Army of the Potomac was, according to the most recent intelligence, some way to the north east of Gettysburg. In fairness the Confederates would have known the position of the Union army had general JEB Stuart not gone AWOL, taking his cavalry on an extensive circuit of the area. Although his rule was principally to provide reconnaissance for Lee’s army, his failure to report regularly left the Army of Northern Virginia essentially blind to the enemy’s movements until his return late on July 2 by which time the army was already engaged.
Robert E Lee is widely held to be the greatest army commander of his age, capable of daring insights and brilliant execution. Indeed, up to Gettysburg, Lee’s army had been undefeated. Despite their fewer numbers, they simply did not know what defeat felt or looked like. But on this particular day, Lee’s judgement failed him and he put together a battle plan that overstepped the boundaries of ‘courageous’ into just plain suicidal.
General Lee reasoned that the flanks of the Union army had held up well on the previous two days and must therefore have been supported by troops from the centre redeployed to the flanks, thereby weakening the centre. He planned to attack the centre directly, head on, despite being exposed to union cannon fire on three sides.
Why did Lee even consider this strategy? Ironically I think the blame may lie with the ghost of general Thomas Jonathan “Stonewall” Jackson, a famously aggressive Confederate commander. In the aftermath of the victory at Chancellorsville (April 30–May 6, 1863), achieved in part by Jackson’s contribution, Lee truly believed his Army of Northern Virginia to be invincible and would often ask himself when considering a manoeuvre “what would General Jackson do?”. The likelihood is that Jackson would have talked Lee out of the attack.
The centre of the union army was camped on Cemetery Ridge behind a stone wall with a handful of cannon. Lee planned to start with a massive artillery assault focused on the stone wall and the soldiers behind it. More than 160 confederate cannons under the direct command of General William Pendleton were to lay down a barrage for two hours prior to any soldiers attacking. At the time this was the largest barrage ever used by an army. Following cessation of the barrage, around 1 PM, the Confederate corps under the command of General George Pickett were to march over the fields in front of the the union cannons and take the position. They were to walk, not run, eerily pre-echoing the instructions given to British soldiers on the first day of the Somme.
When he handed out his battle orders to his subordinate generals there was widespread unease. General James Longstreet, essentially Lee’s battlefield enforcer believed the plan destined to fail and told Lee so, coming dangerously close to insubordination in the act. General Pickett was equally surprised and noted that when he asked if he should advance, Longstreet was able only to nod, physically incapable of vocalising the order.
With hindsight, always a beautiful thing, the scale of the defeat might have been very different. Consider these aspects:
Firstly the Confederate bombardment was excessive and ineffective. It was excessive in the sense that two hours of bombardment gave the union soldiers plenty of time to redeploy away from what was the fixed target chosen by the Confederate bombardment.
Secondly, the barrels of the Confederate guns became so hot that the shells travelled further and exploded behind the union lines rather than directly on top of them. Supply trains, support units and medical evacuations were the main targets actually hit.
Thirdly the Confederate guns were supporting the troops from a distance of between one and two miles. It’s asking a lot of artillery at that time to strike distant targets with serious accuracy.
Fourthly and perhaps the most important action by the Union artillerymen under the command of General Winfield Hancock was to cease or slow the rate of firing in reply. This gave the Confederate commanders the impression that the target had been destroyed and therefore they might have an easier assault on the Unionist position. Their expectations were soon to be severely dashed.
Fifthly and perhaps the most single decisive element was the type of charge used by the Unionist artillery. Unavailable to the Confederate artillery because of their distance from the conflict, the union artillery used ‘canister’ at short range. Canister is essentially a charge consisting of ball and shrapnel, devastatingly effective at short distances, turning each canon into a wide shot gun type blast. This alone would probably have sorted the Confederate army on its own but, used against tired soldiers who had already crossed nearly a mile of open field, it was devastating.
The attack failed, the casualties were enormous and the invincibility myth of the Confederate army punctured for good. Pickett’s Charge as it came to be known left some 6,000 Confederate soldiers dead, wounded or missing from the initial attacking force of 12,500. As severely wounded stragglers began to return to the Confederate lines, Lee ordered Pickett to reform his division for a counter-attack. Pickett replied “General, I have no division”. And he didn’t.
For the first time, the Army of Northern Virginia had to withdraw from the battlefield and regroup. The armies would meet again at the Battle of Bristoe Station (October 14, 1863) but by now this was an army in retreat.
